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LEST WE REGRESS TO THE DARK AGES: HOLDING
VOLUNTARY SURGICAL CASTRATION CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL, EVEN FOR CHILD MOLESTERS
Catherine Rylyk"
Innocence is trampled as debauchery and brutality reign unfettered in the world of
child molesters. Reports of the sexual assault and molestation of innocent children-
arguably the most vulnerable members of our community-weigh on the hearts and
minds of all Americans. The magnitude of this problem is readily conveyed through
statistics. One of every four girls is sexually assaulted before the age of eighteen, and
one in six boys meets the same unfortunate fate.' Though most child sex offenders
will harm between one and nine victims, approximately twenty percent will target ten
to forty children.2 Each year an estimated 100,000 to 500,000 children are sexually
molested in the United States. Terrifyingly, these staggering rates continue to rise.4
Though the increase can be attributed at least in part to "an increase in actual identifi-
cation and reporting of child sexual abuse," concern for the magnitude of this problem
properly remains.'
The release of convicted child molesters following the conclusion of their prison
terms helps fuel these unsettling assault statistics. In a single year, 4300 convicted
child sex offenders were freed from prison. One study suggests that "recidivism in
child molesters ranges from twenty-two to forty percent," whereas other researchers
estimate that long-term relapse rates approach fifty percent.7 These horrific crimes
are all too frequent and recidivism rates far too high.
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2008. Catherine thanks all of BORJ's staff who
helped polish this Note for publication. She also thanks her parents, Andy and Camilla, for
their unwavering love and support.
l Darkness to Light, Statistics Surrounding Child Sexual Abuse, http://www.darkness
2light.org/KnowAbout/statistics-2.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
2 id.
3 William Winslade et al., Castrating Pedophiles Convicted of Sex Offenses Against
Children: New Treatment or Old Punishment?, 51 SMU L. REV. 349, 359 (1998).
' See id.
Id. Even though reporting rates appear on the rise, child molestation remains one of the
most underreported crimes. Yello Dyno, Child Molester Statistics, http://www.yellodyno.com
html/child_molesterstats.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). One study shows that less than
eleven percent of child molestation cases are ever disclosed. Id.
6 Life Tips, Sex Offender and Child Molester Statistics, http://childprotection.lifetips
.com/cat/63573/sex-offender-statistics/index.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
' The Center for American Cultural Renewal, Abuser Goes Free Without Restrictions,
http://www.cfacr.org/pages/article.php?aid=679 (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
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As haunting images of child victims like JonBen6t Ramsey's striking bright eyes8
and Jessica Lunsford's wide smile and fuzzy pink hat9 blaze across media wires, a
resounding outcry is heard demanding protection for our fragile youth. As the tradi-
tional formula of incarceration leading to parole is criticized in light of the undeniably
high recidivism rates for sexual deviants, several states have responded by providing
voluntary castration as an alternative means of rehabilitation, and others consider
adding the treatment to their books.'°
Though lawmakers and convicts alike rally behind enacting statutory provisions
for voluntary castration, many opponents are appropriately concerned that the punish-
ment violates the Eighth Amendment." This Note seeks to determine whether the
Constitution's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment should bar sentences with
the option of voluntary castration. Part I analyzes the Eighth Amendment, consider-
ing both the law's derivation and subsequent case history developing the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause's meaning. Applying analytical themes extracted from
Supreme Court case law, Part II evaluates whether voluntary castration-achieved
chemically or surgically-is constitutional. Concluding that chemical, but not surgical,
castration should be deemed permissible, the discussion in Part 1IH examines whether
courts should allow waiver of Eighth Amendment protections. This Note suggests
that because waiver of Eighth Amendment protections against unjust punishments
should never be permitted, only voluntary chemical castration may be adopted as a
constitutional punishment. 12 The penalty of surgical castration, even if submitted to
freely, is cruel and unusual.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION OF CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
A short though powerful protection of individual rights, the Eighth Amendment
states in full: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
8 See JonBen6t-Ramsey.com, http://jonbenet-ramsey.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
9 See The Jessica Marie Lunsford Foundation, http://www.jessicamarielunsford.com (last
visited Jan. 14, 2008).
'0 See CAL. PENALCODE § 645 (West 2002) (requiring "medroxyprogesterone acetate treat-
ment or its chemical equivalent" as an element of parole following second sexual offense); FLA.
STAT. § 794.0235 (1997) (allowing a court to order a criminal's voluntary physical castration);
see also Frank Green, Crime Commission Seeks Data on Castration, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
Sept. 13, 2006, at B2 (discussing the state legislature's hesitance to accept Virginia Senator
Emmett W. Hanger Jr.'s "proposal to permit the voluntary surgical castration of sex offenders
to avoid indefinite civil commitment").
"' See Candace Rondeaux, Can Castration Be a Solution for Sex Offenders?, WASH. POST,
July 5, 2006, at B 1 (discussing the controversy over adopting a castration statute in Virginia).
12 Though voluntary castration is referred to interchangeably as a punishment and a treat-
ment throughout this Note, a discussion of the merits of voluntary castration as a rehabilitative
treatment, as distinct from a punishment, is beyond the scope of this discussion.
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cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."' 3 By declining to explicitly enumerate the
punishments prohibited by the Amendment, the drafters helped establish a "flexible
and dynamic" standard of scrutiny. 4 Consistent with the drafters' original intent, the
Supreme Court has refused to compose an exhaustive list of punishments precluded
by the Amendment. 5 In particular, the Court has yet to directly address the constitu-
tionality of voluntary castration. 6 Without such an unequivocal decision, the legality
of the punishment can only be deciphered in the context of the Amendment's origins
and the developing case law.
A. Derivation of the Eighth Amendment
1. European Predecessors
Academic scholars and judges alike trace the underpinnings of the Eighth
Amendment to anterior religious teachings and statutory laws. 7 Professor Anthony
F. Granucci suggests that one of the early expressions of the Western "prohibition of
excessive punishment" is found in the Old Testament's requirement that punishment
equal the crime.' The Book of Leviticus states, "If a man injures his neighbor, what
he has done must be done to him: broken limb for broken limb, eye for eye, tooth
for tooth. As the injury inflicted, so must be the injury suffered.' 9 This canonical
aversion to extreme punishment is echoed in the Magna Carta, which states: "A free
man shall not be fined for a small offence, except in proportion to the measure of
the offence; and for a great offence he shall be fined in proportion to the magnitude
of the offence, saving his freehold."2° Thus, the prohibition of cruel and unusual
" U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976).
1 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,99 (1958) (acknowledging that the Supreme Court has yet
to fix the "exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual"').
16 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let's Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by
Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REv. 615, 628 (2000) (noting that
as of Winter 2000, the Supreme Court had "not had the opportunity" to adjudicate whether
castration violated the Eighth Amendment). Subsequent research reveals that this statement
remains true.
'" See generally Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted":
The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839 (1969) (providing an extensive analysis of the
Eighth Amendment's development); Kirchmeier, supra note 16, at 618 (providing a succinct
overview of the derivation of the Eighth Amendment's language).
IS Id. at 844.
I9 d. (quoting Leviticus 24:19-20 (Jerusalem)).
20 MAGNA CARTA (1215), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 11, 15 (Richard L. Perry
ed., 1959); see also Granucci, supra note 17, at 845 (suggesting that three chapters of the
Magna Carta were written in response to "[t]he problem of excessive amercements").
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punishments evolved out of "the longstanding principle ... that the punishment
should fit the crime.",
21
Though these spiritual and secular texts introduced the notion of proportion to
punishments under the English common law, the language of the Eighth Amendment
most closely mirrors the English Bill of Rights.22 Enacted on December 16, 1689, the
pertinent section reads: "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive
fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."' The Eighth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution displays a subtle change from its English predecessor, a super-
ficial alteration in the phrasing-substituting "shall not be required" for "ought not
to be required."'24 Despite this minimal vernacular tweaking, the English Bill of Rights
of 1689 is recognized as the first document containing the phrase "cruel and unusual
punishments, 25 and as such, is the "direct ancestor of the bills of rights adopted by the
states at the time of the American Revolution. 26 Though displaying similar phrase-
ology, each version has been applied to prohibit sentencing abuses unique to their
respective societies.27 The English Bill of Rights of 1689 specifically forbade the
imposition of disproportionate punishments unauthorized by statute or beyond the
court's jurisdiction.28 Alternatively, the Founders applied the Eighth Amendment
to prohibit categorically "barbarous" and "cruel" punishments. 29 Held against this
historical background, the Eighth Amendment's prohibitions are understood to be
drawn from scriptural pronouncements and traditional European law and framed by
its distinctly American context.
2. Roots of the Eighth Amendment in Early American Law
The English Bill of Rights of 1689 is recognized as the template followed by the
Eighth Amendment's drafters, but several early American statutes also included im-
portant protections against unreasonable punishments. These early American laws
also likely influenced the Amendment's final composition."
21 Richard L. Perry, Bill of Rights 1689, in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 20,
at 222, 236.
22 BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 20, at
245, 245-47.
23 Id. at 247.
24 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, with BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 247.
25 Granucci, supra note 17, at 852.
26 Perry, supra note 21, at 244.
27 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-70 (1976).
28 Granucci, supra note 17, at 860.
29 Id. at 851, 860.
30 See generally Mark D. Cahn, Punishment, Discretion, and the Codification ofPrescribed
Penalties in Colonial Massachusetts, 33 AM. J. LEGALHIST. 107 (1989) (describing the codifi-
cation of statutory punishments during the colonial era in an effort to reign in the inconsistent
and discretionary penal system).
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Reverend Nathaniel Ward, a Puritan attorney, is credited with writing the first
American prohibition against cruel punishments." The Massachusetts Bay Colony
seethed with political unrest during the mid 1600s, as colonists believed "their condition
very unsafe, [because] so much power rested in the discretion of the magistrates" who
customarily imposed arbitrary and severe punishments.32 The colonists demanded the
"publication of rules to guide the magistrates" in the administration of their office.33
In response to this "lack of fundamental laws" and the mistrust of judicial authority,
committees formed to draft codes establishing the colonists' rights.34 Assisting one
of these drafting committees, Reverend Ward penned a set of laws entitled the Body
of Liberties.35 Enacted in 1641, the Body of Liberties contained two clauses pre-
scribing punishment limitations.36 Clause 43 prohibits "Excessive punishments,"
stating, "No man shall be beaten with above 40 stripes, nor shall any true gentleman,
nor any man equall to a gentleman be punished with whipping, unles his crime be very
shamefull, and his course of life vitious and profligate. '3 7 Clause 46 precludes the
use of any "Inhuman punishment," declaring that "For bodilie punishments we allow
amongst us none that are inhumane Barbarous or cruel. 38 These clauses reflect the
Bay colonists' shared concerns with the English-though an ocean apart, both soci-
eties were troubled by abuses of the sentencing power wielded by their respective
government officials.
Reaffirming the desire to curb the use of unconstitutional penalties, sections of
Ward's Body of Liberties were incorporated into the Massachusetts Bay Colony's
Code of 1648.3' The Code, also referred to as the Laws and Liberties, retained a gen-
eral restriction prohibiting "in-humane, barbarous or cruel" punishments.' While
preserving some of the language from the Body of Liberties, the Code diverges through
its detail. Unlike the general principles outlined by its predecessor, the Code was
composed as a "handbook for justices" in order to greatly restrict discretionary sen-
tencing.41 Exact penalties were prescribed for an extensive list of offenses, thereby
establishing "precise measures of punishment. 4 2 Read in its historical context, the
3' See Granucci, supra note 17, at 851.
32 Cahn, supra note 30, at 108 (quoting 1 WINTHROP'S JOURNAL 1630-1649, at 323 (J.
Hosmer ed., 1908) (1639)).
13 Id. at 115.
" Granucci, supra note 17, at 850-51.
3' Richard L. Perry, Massachusetts Body of Liberties, in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES,
supra note 20, at 143-44.
36 MASSACHUsETrs BODYOFLBERTIES (1641), reprinted in SOURCES OFOUR LIBERTIES,
supra note 20, at 148, 153.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Granucci, supra note 17, at 860.
40 Cahn, supra note 30, at 132.
41 Id. at 131-32.
42 Id. at 132-33. For example, the severity of the punishment for burglary was gauged
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Laws and Liberties reflects the colonists' increasing demand for justice in the pre-
scription of penalties."3 As anxiety over unreasonably harsh and arbitrary sanctions
spread, the Code of 1648 influenced laws enacted in several other American colonies,
including neighboring Connecticut and New Haven."
Though one can argue the political impact of the Massachusetts laws reached
beyond settlements adjacent to the Bay Colony and traveled south,45 the English Bill
of Rights of 1689 clearly affected the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights. When
drafting Section 9 of the Virginia Constitution's Bill of Rights, George Mason copied
the exact language of the tenth section of the English Bill of Rights of 1689.' Through
this adoption, Mason perpetuated the "general political philosophy" that the power
of the judiciary to impose cruel and unusual punishments required constraints in order
to protect individual rights.47 The American Declaration of Rights is appropriately
recognized as a "restatement of English principles-the principles of Magna Charta
[sic]" and the English Bill of Rights." Even before the Eighth Amendment was en-
acted, the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was a familiar protection
espoused in English law and deeply rooted in the developing American legal tradition.
B. Case Law Interpreting the Application of the Eighth Amendment
As the Constitution's drafters likely drew from several documents when composing
the Eighth Amendment, it is understandable that "effort[s] to define [the Amendment]
with exactness" are difficult.49 Members of the first Congress acknowledged the ambig-
uousness of the Eighth Amendment's prohibitions: Mr. Smith of South Carolina
"objected to the words 'nor cruel and unusual punishments"' for "being too indefinite,"
while Mr. Livermore opposed the Clause's adoption on the grounds that "it seems
using the offender's previous record and "by the day upon which the offense occurred." Id.
at 133.
13 Cf Cahn, supra note 30, at 133-34 (arguing that although the effect of the Code was
to "restrict[] the discretion of the magistrates," much of the magistrates' "traditional discretion"
was preserved).
" Granucci, supra note 17, at 860 (citing George L. Haskins & Samuel E. Ewing, The
Spread of Massachusetts Law in the Seventeenth Century, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 413,414 (1958)).
41 Id. at 860-61. Professor Granucci hypothesizes that George Mason may have "learned
of Ward's work through an intercolonial process of diffusion." Id.
46 Compare VIRGINIA DECLARATION OFRIGHTS (1776), reprinted in A.E. DICK HOWARD,
THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONsTITuTIONALISM IN AMERICA 452,
454 (1968), with BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 247.
47 Richard L. Perry, Constitution of Virginia, in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note
20, at 301, 303.
4 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 n. 10 (1983) (quoting A. NEVINS, THE AMERICAN
STATES DURING AND AFrER THE REVOLUTION 146 (1924)), overruled by Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
49 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878).
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to have no meaning in it."50 As Mr. Livermore correctly concluded, "[i]t lies with the
court to determine" the Amendment's meaning.5 1
1. The Supreme Court's Approach to the Eighth Amendment
Though the Eighth Amendment was ratified with the Bill of Rights on
December 15, 1791,52 the Supreme Court did not hear a case dealing squarely with
the constitutionality of a punishment until 1878. 5' Following the Amendment's
adoption, several themes emerged in the Supreme Court's review of penalties under
the Eighth Amendment.' The Court's Eighth Amendment analysis focused on five
primary issues: (1) the inherent cruelty of the punishment; (2) the proportionality of
the crime to the punishment; (3) whether the Court should give deference to the legis-
lature; (4) the prevalence of the punishment's use; and (5) public opinion surrounding
the punishment's application. Each of these themes is further described below.
a. Prohibition of "inhumane, barbarous, or cruel" punishments
In its most straightforward and historically contextualized reading, the Eighth
Amendment is recognized as protecting against "inhumane, [b]arbarous, or cruel"
treatment.55 Restated, all punishments must "comport[] with human dignity. ' 56 As
Justice Brennan hauntingly articulated:
5 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 244 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789)).
51 Id.
52 ERWiN CHEMERINSKY, CONsTrruTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 12 (2d ed.
2002).
" See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. 130 (upholding the sentence of a convicted murderer to be
publicly shot). See generally Kirchmeier, supra note 16, at 619-29 (providing an excellent
chronological analysis of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
" Although the Supreme Court developed a series of factors to guide review of sentences,
the Court has not formally adopted a specific test for its Eighth Amendment analysis. See
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,295 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (proposing an objective
three factor test for Eighth Amendment review based on prior case law); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (developing a loose two-prong test which assesses the "contemporary
values concerning the infliction of [the] challenged sanction" and whether the sentence is in
"accord with 'the dignity of man' (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)); see also
Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 388 (noting that "the U.S. Supreme Court has established no
clear standard for determining whether a particular punishment or term of incarceration is
permissible under the Eighth Amendment").
" In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 & n.1 (1890) (quoting COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSErrs 43 (1889)).
56 Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
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The true significance of [unconstitutional] punishments is that
they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects
to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with
the fundamental premise of the Clause that even the vilest criminal
remains a human being possessed of common human dignity."
Merciless punishments imposed without regard for the offender's humanity are pro-
hibited for their truculence.
Beginning with the earliest Eighth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court con-
sidered "the element of cruelty present" in the challenged punishment.58 The Court
readily acknowledged that the Amendment precluded punishments that "involve[d]
torture or a lingering death."5 9 Inflicting "acute pain and suffering," 6 particularly
"unnecessary and wanton" pain, was also prohibited. 6' Assessments of sanctioned
punishments were not limited to reading sentences in their black and white terms.
Punishments considered just in the abstract were held unconstitutional if cruelty and
unnecessary pain were "inherent in the method of punishment., 62 Furthermore, the
Eighth Amendment not only protected against physically intolerable punishments;
sentences that produced severe mental suffering were also held unconstitutional.63
Therefore both the method and result of a punishment must be considered when the
constitutionality of a punishment is assessed under the Eighth Amendment.
b. Proportionality
When assessing the cruelty inherent in a punishment, early courts compared the
character of the crime to the severity of the punishment. Reflecting on this convention,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]he principle that a punishment should be
proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law
jurisprudence." 64 Thus, while Professor Granucci argues that the Eighth Amendment
" Furman, 408 U.S. at 272-73.
58 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
" In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447; see also discussion infra Part I.B.2 (listing unconstitu-
tional torturous punishments).
' O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (discussing estab-
lished concepts of which punishments the Eighth Amendment targeted).
61 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
62 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947).
63 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (holding denationalization unconsti-
tutional because it "subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress"); In
re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890) (noting that many prisoners subjected to solitary
confinement for the duration of imprisonment proceeding execution became either semi-
fatuous or violently insane, and thus extreme isolation paired with capital punishment was
considered "too severe").
T4 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
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was primarily adopted to prohibit torturous punishments, the Court suggested that
the Framers "also adopted the English principle of proportionality" when incorporat-
ing language from the English Bill of Rights.65
A foundational Eighth Amendment case supports the use of this balancing inquiry.
In O'Neil v. Vermont, Justice Field's dissent recognized that the Eighth Amendment's
"inhibition is directed, not only against punishments of the character mentioned,
[atrocious conduct], but against all punishments which by their excessive length or
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged. 66 Subsequent Courts
applied Justice Field's comparative analysis.67 When weighing the crime against its
sentence, the Court would not consider the punishment in the abstract but looked to
the circumstances particular to the case.68 Judges strove to render informed sentences,
taking "the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities
of the offender" into account.69 The symmetry between punishments and the crime
precipitating the extreme penalty was highly scrutinized.7"
Under the rubric of proportionality, the Court also considered the availability
of alternative punishments when assessing the sentence imposed. Punishments that
offered the "most humane and practical method known to modem science" to carry
out the intended sentence, and did so instantaneously and painlessly, were typically
upheld.7" Punishments that were unnecessarily brutal when compared to statutory
alternatives were more likely to be considered unconstitutional.7
In a more recent decision, the Court overruled prior cases as "simply wrong" and
forcefully stated "the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee. 73
Writing for the majority in Harmelin v. Michigan, Justice Scalia referred to the his-
torical context of the Eighth Amendment's adoption and concluded that the drafters
were concerned with the "illegality, rather than disproportionality, of punishment
in general."74 The Court rejected the proportionality inquiry as an "invitation to
65 Id. at 285-86; see also text accompanying note 28.
66 O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
67 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
68 Id. 'To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which
is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day
in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Id.; see also Kirchmeier, supra note 16, at 627 (suggesting that the Court considered "objective
criteria" of proportionality when assessing the facts in Solem v. Helm).
69 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (citing Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v.
Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937)).
70 Id. at 187.
71 See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443-44 (1890).
72 Id. at 444 (upholding a New York law that replaced hanging with electrocution as the
means to carry out a death sentence because electrocution was considered less barbarous).
73 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991).
71 Id. at 966-74. Justice Scalia reasoned that the drafters purposefully failed to adopt a
prohibition of "disproportionate" or "excessive" punishments despite their common usage
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imposition of subjective values. 7 5 This seemingly inflexible rejection of propor-
tionality review was tempered by the concession that proportionality can be assessed
when reviewing capital sentences, because "death is different" from other punish-
ments. 6 Death, unlike a lengthy prison sentence or an unwieldy fine, is irrevocable."
In Harmelin's wake, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence only allows for subjective
proportionality review in cases dealing with the most extreme punishments.
c. The Court's deference to the legislature
As a basic rule, the Supreme Court granted deference to the legislature in assess-
ing a penalty's relative cruelty and proportionality. State legislatures were entrusted
to "define offences and prescribe the punishment of the offenders. 78 Legislative
exercises of power were "fortified by presumptions of right and legality, and [were]
not to be interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial conception of their wisdom or
propriety. 79 As a result, statutory punishments were presumed valid.8° When con-
sidering the appropriateness of any punishment, the Court recognized that "some
State will always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more severely
than any other State.",8' Furthermore, the federal system allowed sovereign states
to "criminalize an act that other States do not criminalize at all., 82 Thus, Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence recognized a strong presumption of legislative consti-
tutionality in order to support the democratic ideals of federalism.
Pursuant to this high level of deference, the Court repeatedly upheld seemingly
unreasonable sentences. Cumulative punishments for distinct offenses83 and severe
penalties under recidivist statutes were upheld.84 Solidifying the principle of def-
erence, Rummel v. Estelle established the "proposition that federal courts should
be 'reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment.' ' 85 But
in contemporary laws. Id. at 967. Thus, he argued that "the phrase 'cruell and unusuall' [was]
treated as interchangeable with 'cruel and illegal."' Id. at 973.
71 Id. at 986.
76 Id. at 994.
77 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,287 (1972) ("The only explanation for the unique-
ness of death is its extreme severity."); cf Kirchmeier, supra note 16, at 627 (suggesting that
a majority of the Justices reaffirmed proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment
despite Scalia's articulated rejection of such a review).
78 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 133 (1878).
71 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1909).
80 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976).
8, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282 (1980).
82 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991).
83 See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370,371 (1982) (upholding a verdict fining the defendant
"$10,000 and [imposing] a prison term of 20 years on each of the two counts" of marijuana
possession with intent to distribute).
4 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285.
85 Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274).
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because the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments was intended to restrain
the legislature, which "would otherwise have had the unfettered power to prescribe
punishments for crimes," the ultimate "responsibility lies with the courts to make
certain that the prohibition of the Clause is enforced. 86 The Court is obligated to
reject statutory sentences if the punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.
d. Prevalence of the punishment's use
Consistent with the Court's deference to the legislature, the more widely used
the punishment, the more likely the Court found the sentence constitutional. Courts
exercised wide discretion when defining the prevalence of a punishment's use. 7 The
historical application of the punishment,88 military customs,8 9 and society's response
to the punishment' all functioned as indicators of the extent of a punishment's practice.
Reframed, this inquiry considered whether the punishment was "unusual" according
to the common denotation of the word-whether the punishment is an "ordinary one,
[or whether it] signifiies] something different from that which is generally done." 9
In addition to considering the historical use of the punishment, the Court also
looked at the punishment's demographic application. Furman v. Georgia held that
the Eighth Amendment is a "proscription against selective and irregular use of pen-
alties." 92 A punishment could not be reserved and applied "selectively to minorities
whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but whom
society, is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance general application
of the same penalty across the board." 93 Otherwise appropriate penalties would be
applied unconstitutionally if used "sparsely, selectively, and spottily." 94 Therefore,
86 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263, 267 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
87 Cf Kirchmeier, supra note 16, at 624 (suggesting that the Justices rejected the idea of
applying a "strict historical interpretation of the Eighth Amendment" when deciding Furman,
as they "refused to limit the amendment's restrictions to punishments that were prohibited
in the late Eighteenth Century").
88 Furman, 408 U.S. at 278.
89 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1878).
9 Furman, 408 U.S. at 279.
91 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958).
92 Furman, 408 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring).
93 Id.
4 Id. at 256. Justice Douglas suggested:
Any penalty, a fine, imprisonment or the death penalty could be unfairly
or unjustly applied. The vice... is not in the penalty but in the process
by which it is inflicted. It is unfair to inflict unequal penalties on
equally guilty parties, or on any innocent parties, regardless of what the
penalty is.
Id. at 247-48 (quoting Hearing before Subcomm. No. 3 of H. Comm. on Judiciary, 92d Cong.
116-17 (1972) (statement of Earnest van den Haag)).
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punishments that are arbitrarily or discriminatorily imposed, and not customarily
applied, are unconstitutional. 95
e. Public opinion
While considering past assessments and present applications of sentences, the
Supreme Court recognized that punishments acquire new meaning under the Eighth
Amendment through the evolution of public opinion.96 The challenged punishment
should be acceptable to contemporary society in order to be determined constitu-
tional.97 Public opinion can be gauged by legislative response, 98 jury verdicts, 99 and
public reaction to sentencing practices.'0° "Rejection by society ... is a strong
indication that a severe punishment does not comport with human dignity" and
should be held unconstitutional. °0
2. Punishments Held Unconstitutional
The Eighth Amendment and its precursors were drafted to protect citizens from
punishments that "disgraced the civilization of former ages" and would "make one
shudder with horror to read of them."' 0 2 These statements reflect social abhorrence
to the "violent proceedings [that had] taken place in England in the arbitrary reigns
of some of the Stuarts."'103 Without applying the five analytical themes discussed
above, the Court established the per se illegality of many disturbing archaic punish-
ments. Certain punishments, such as torture by use of "the rack, the thumb-screw, the
iron boot, [and] the stretching of the limbs,"' '° or by "cutting off the hands or ears,
" Id. at 249; see also Kenneth Fromson, Note, Beyond an Eye for an Eye: Castration as
an Alternative Sentencing Measure, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 317 (noting that one
of the elements of Eighth Amendment review applied by Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion to Furman v. Georgia was whether "there [was] a strong probability that [the punish-
ment was] inflicted arbitrarily" (citation omitted)).
96 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1919).
97 Furman, 408 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring).
98 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-94 (1977); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 179-80 (1976).
99 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 (finding "[t]he jury also is a significant and reliable objective
index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved").
'O See Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43,
59-62 (1998) (discussing the forces behind the promulgation of sex crime laws and identifying
the "three key forces" as "psychiatrists, the news media, and an anxious public").
'0' Furman, 408 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring).
102 Whitten v. Georgia, 47 Ga. 297, 301 (1872); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 373 (1910).
103 Weems, 217 U.S. at 371.
"o O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
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branding on the face or hand, slitting the nostrils, [or] placing the prisoner in the
pillory" were considered by certain Supreme Court Justices and the lower courts to be
inherently unconstitutional.0 5 Several methods of capital punishment, including dis-
embowelment, beheading, quartering, and burning alive at the stake were readily rec-
ognized as violating the Eighth Amendment. 6 Crucifixion and breaking on the wheel
were similarly repulsive. 107 All of these "'barbarous' methods [of punishment] ...
were generally outlawed in the 18th century" with the Amendment's adoption.
1 8
But because the scope of the Eighth Amendment is "not static" and must "draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society," punishments classified as cruel and unusual continue to expand with the
growing case law.' 9 As Justice McKenna aptly stated, "[t]ime works changes, [and]
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.""0 In
response to evolving social conditions, solitary confinement coupled with withholding
the prisoner's execution date,"' denationalization, 1 2 and imprisonment for mere
status" 3 were all held as unconstitutional punishments despite their once accepted
use. A current determination of a punishment's constitutionality does not preclude
the Court from later finding an Eighth Amendment violation.
1I. VOLUNTARY CASTRATION UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Even though the Supreme Court has yet to establish a definitive standard for
assessing a punishment's permissibility under the Eighth Amendment," 4 the analytical
themes described in Part I can be applied to consider the constitutionality of vol-
untary castration. But before proceeding, a brief description of the punishment in
question is required.
A. Defining Voluntary Castration
Voluntary castration as related to criminal punishment takes two forms: chem-
ical and surgical."1 5 Chemical castration, the less invasive of the two methods of
'05 Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 417 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd, 242 U.S. 468 (1917).
1o6 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1878).
107 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890).
108 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976).
09 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
"o Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
"' See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
112 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
"' See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,667 (1962) (holding imprisonment for having
a drug addiction as cruel and unusual).
". Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 388.
"' See generally id. at 365-76 (discussing possible treatment options for sex offenders).
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treatment, "involves the use of various types of medications and hormones, most
intended to inhibit testosterone production in the body."' 16 Patients are given peri-
odic injections for the duration of treatment in order to achieve the desired effects." 7
Unlike chemical castration, the surgical alternative, also called orchiectomy, is com-
plete after a single procedure."' The operation involves the "removal of a man's
testes."" 9 Both methods of castration lower the level of testosterone in the body. 2
The end result sought by both procedures is to treat the offender's deviant sexual
behavior by decreasing his sex drive.' 2'
B. Assessing the Constitutionality of Voluntary Castration
1. Voluntary Castration as Cruel
A basic understanding of the challenged punishment provides a basis for de-
termining whether voluntary castration is an inhumane and torturous punishment
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. In addition, court assessments of castration
and medical appraisals of the physiological effects of the two methods of treatment
can help determine whether voluntary castration is indeed cruel.
Courts commonly reference castration when listing forbidden punishments. In
Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court described a group of punishments-
castration, quartering, and hanging in chains-as barbaric.'2 2 Castration is linked to
other gruesome punishments traditionally employed in Europe during the seventeenth
century.'23 This grim coupling expresses the Weems Court's objection to the brutality
of surgical castration, which during the 1600s consisted of violent mutilation. 24 As
chemical castration was not yet developed by the turn of the twentieth century, 25 the
Court's 1909 condemnation cannot extend to the modern treatment.
116 Id. at 366.
"' Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Sexual Offender,
18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 6 (1990). When medroxyprogesterone acetate is used for treatment, the
offender is given "weekly intramuscular injections" of the drug. Id.
118 See Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 369.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 366, 369.
121 id.
122 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910).
123 Id.; see Granucci, supra note 17, at 853-54. The penalty for treason in England during
the "Bloody Assize" trials of 1685 "consisted of drawing the condemned man on a cart to
the gallows, where he was hanged by the neck, cut down while still alive, disemboweled and
his bowels burnt before him, and then beheaded and quartered." Id.
124 Weems, 217 U.S. at 377.
123 Chemical castration was first used approximately forty years ago. Douglas J. Besharov
&Andrew Vachhs, Sex Offenders: Is Castration an Acceptable Punishment?, A.B.A.J., May
1992, at 42.
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State courts have adopted a similar tone towards surgical castration. When re-
viewing a state statute requiring criminals to submit to vasectomies, District Judge
Smith McPherson noted Blackstone's failure to "mention castration as one of the
cruel punishments," hypothesizing that the omission reflected modem society's view
that "the operation was.., too cruel."' 26 In Mickle v. Henrichs, the Nevada district
court held that imposing a vasectomy as punishment for rape, "or any other similar
mutilation of the body," was "ignominious and degrading, and in that sense is cruel."']27
In State v. Brown, the Supreme Court of South Carolina specified that castration is
"a form of mutilation" prohibited by the state's constitution' 2 Like the Supreme
Court in Weems, these state tribunals vehemently disapproved of the disfiguring
punishment, even if performed using modem medical practices.
The objections to the castration punishment are most applicable to the surgical
procedure. The injection of medications or hormones with a thin hypodermic needle 29
is not nearly as invasive as the surgical removal of internal glands. 3 ' Chemical treat-
ments merely inhibit hormone production;' 3' surgical castration permanently destroys
part of the anatomy that produces testosterone132 Temporary changes in hormone
secretion do not equate to mutilation, but the excision of the genitals perfectly fits the
definition. 133 As the Supreme Court considered mutilation a punishment "wholly
alien to the spirit of our humane general constitution,"'" even though castration was
never held definitively unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, 135 the opinions
expressed by both federal and state judges establish grounds for a presumption of
surgical castration's illegality as a cruel punishment of mutilation.
In addition to reviewing court assessments of the direct results of chemical and
surgical castration, the lingering effects of each procedure must also be considered.
Both castration techniques are accompanied by significant side effects. Estrogens
used in chemical treatments may "cause nausea, vomiting, feminization, and...
carcinoma of the breast."' 36 Medroxyprogesterone acetate, the most common synthetic
126 Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413,416 (S.D. Iowa 1914) (emphasis added), rev'd, 242 U.S.
468 (1917).
127 262 F. 687, 690-91 (D. Nev. 1918).
128 326 S.E.2d 410,412 (S.C. 1985). The South Carolina Constitution mirrors the Eighth
Amendment, the pertinent clause reading: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall exces-
sive fines be imposed, nor shall cruel, nor corporal, nor unusual punishment be inflicted ... 
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
129 Fitzgerald, supra note 117, at 36.
130 Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 369.
131 Id. at 366.
132 Id. at 369.
131 Mutilation is defined as "the excision or maiming of a limb or bodily organ." OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1870 (5th ed. 2002).
"' Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,981 (1991) (citing BENJAMIN OLIVER, THE RIGHTS
OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 186 (1832)).
131 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
136 Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 367.
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drug used for chemical castration, is known to "cause weight gain, hypertension, mild
lethargy, cold sweats, nightmares, hot flashes, and muscle aches."' 37 These unpleasant
side effects are diminutive in comparison to surgical castration's severe consequences.
Physical responses following removal of the testes include "changes in metabolic
processes,. . . lowering of hemoglobin percentage, changes in fat distribution in the
body, diminution of the calcium content of bones... and diminishment of beard and
body hair."' 38 In addition to these biological shifts, surgery patients also suffer from
depression and suicidal tendencies. 139 Similar psychological repercussions are not
associated with chemical treatment.' 4 The secondary effects of surgical castration
are cumulatively much more damaging to the offender's physical and mental health
than the side effects associated with the chemical alternative.
As traditional Eighth Amendment case law focuses on the brutality of surgical
castration and current medical research reveals the operation's uniquely severe side
effects, surgical castration is readily identified as a cruel punishment.
2. Weighing the Proportionality of Voluntary Castration Against the Crime of
Sexual Assault and Alternative Punishments
Even though the Supreme Court largely repudiated proportionality analysis under
the Eighth Amendment,"' the traditional test remains helpful in highlighting current
concerns over voluntary castration's relative cruelty. Acknowledging the Court's cur-
rent limited proportionality review, 142 it is also appropriate to compare voluntary
castration to capital punishment-to which the test is still applied.
Under traditional Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, the Court compared
the severity of the crime to its punishment. 143 A typical statute defines the felony
offense of child rape as when a "person has sexual intercourse with another person
by the use of forcible compulsion" and "[t]he victim is a child less than twelve years
of age."' The stark simplicity of the statutory language fails to convey the seriousness
of the crime and its consequences. Children and adolescents-the "most vulnerable
victims"-are commonly the targets of sexual assault.'45 After surviving sexual
attacks, many child victims "suffer[] traumatic and frequently life-long physical and
emotional damage."' 46 The shattering effects of these crimes are truly troubling, as
137 Id.
138 Id. at 371.
139 Id.
40 See Fitzgerald, supra note 117, at 7.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 64-70.
'44 E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.030 (2007).
45 Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 351, 358.
146 Id. at 351. Research suggests that sexual crimes cause more psychological harm to
victims than do other assaults. Lieb et al., supra note 100, at 49. Rape victims commonly
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"[c]hildren who have been sexually abused are more likely to engage in unusual
sexual behaviors than are those who have not."'' 47 Eliciting even greater concern,
many child molesters were once victims of sexual assault; the crime morbidly per-
petuates itself through successive generations of victims. 4 8 In part because of their
unique victim impact, such vulgar and brutal acts are "universally decried as heinous
crimes that merit severe penalties."' 49
In comparison to the disturbing physical and haunting psychological consequences
endured by a non-consenting victim of rape, voluntary castration is a light sentence.
Whether chemically or surgically produced, the convicted felon is given a choice in
avoiding extended incarceration by submitting to treatment. 5 ' Though both medical
procedures may be accompanied by uncomfortable side effects,' the offender retains
some ability to shape his own destiny, unlike his child-victim whose autonomy he irrep-
arably subjugated. 52 As several commentators assert, there is no "disproportionality
issue [because] '[s]exual offenses such as rape and child molestation cause a tre-
mendous amount of social harm."",153 Not only is the victim scarred for life; entire
experience Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, which is "characterized by intrusive recollec-
tions, avoidance responses, and hyperarousal." Id.; see also Arthur H. Garrison, Rape Trauma
Syndrome: A Review of Behavioral Science Theory and Its Admissibility in Criminal Trials,
23 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 591 (2000).
117 Lieb et al., supra note 100, at 49.
'48 Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 351. One study found that seventy-eight percent of
pedophile offenders were victimized during their childhoods. Tom O'Connor & William
Carson, Understanding the Psychology of Child Molesters: A Key to Getting Confessions,
POLICE CHIEF, Dec. 2005, available at http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm
?fuseaction=displayarch&articleid=770&issueid= 22005.
"4 Lieb et al., supra note 100, at 45-46.
150 Some convicted rapists request castration in exchange for a lenient prison term. See J.
Michael Bailey & Aaron S. Greenberg, The Science and Ethics of Castration: Lessons from
the Morse Case, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1225, 1225 (1998).
15' See supra text accompanying notes 136-40.
152 The importance of personal autonomy cannot be overemphasized. Philosophical scholars
recognize that:
[T]o be autonomous is to be one's own person, to be directed by con-
siderations, desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply
imposed externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be con-
sidered one's authentic self. Autonomy in this sense seems an irrefutable
value, especially since its opposite-being guided by forces external to
the self and which one cannot authentically embrace-seems to mark
the height of oppression.
John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (Aug. 27, 2003), available at http://plato.stanford.edulentries/autonomy-
moral/#3. 1.
'13 Courtney Flack, Chemical Castration: An Effective Treatmentforthe Sexually Motivated
Pedophile or an Impotent Alternative to Traditional Incarceration?, 7 J.L. SOC'Y 173, 194
(2005) (citing Jason 0. Runckel, Comment, Abuse It and Lose It: A Look at California's
Mandatory Chemical Castration Law, 28 PAC. L.J. 547, 585 (1997)).
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communities are left reeling.'54 The crime of rape is far more damaging than the
punishment of voluntary castration.
In addition to balancing the crime against its punishment, the Supreme Court
traditionally weighed the severity of the challenged penalty against other available
punishments.' 5 Under the American system of federalism, each state employs its
own criminal code containing sentencing guidelines for recognized offenses. Child
molesters are typically incarcerated in prison or confined in a state behavioral rehabil-
itation center.'56 Prison sentences imposed for a pedophile's first conviction of child
rape can extend from a minimum of five years 57 to life "without benefit of probation,
parole or any other reduction."'58 Many state codes also include statutes for increasing
the duration of incarceration for a second or subsequent rape conviction.' 59 In addition
to imprisonment, several states reserve the right to fine convicted sex offenders; these
fines range from a minimal $2 0 0 " to a bank-breaking $250,000.161 As the most
severe punishment, several states "authorized the death penalty in some cases, but
only where the victim was a child and the rapist an adult."' 62 Though statutes imposing
fines and mandating execution remain on the books in a handful of states, confinement
is the most common method of punishment for sex offenders.'63
' Jim Doyle, Public's Overriding Fear: Will They Do It Again?, S.F. CHRON., July 12,
2004, at Al.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
156 See generally Madelyn J. Daley, Comment, Do Sexually Violent Predators Deserve
Constitutional Protections?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 715, 718 (1999) (discussing the penal system's
adoption of civil confinement).
117 E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1115 (2002).
158 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773 (2003).
159 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2520C (2007) (providing that recidivist offenders are
subject to an "extended term of imprisonment... computed by increasing the maximum
sentence authorized for the crime for which the person was convicted by fifteen (15) years");
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319.01 (2006) (providing that a first offense of sexual assault of a child
is punishable by fifteen years in prison; a second offense will receive twenty-five years); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (2006) (providing that a person guilty of first degree sexual battery
against a minor may receive the minimum sentence of twenty-five years of imprisonment for
a first offense, but "must be punished by death or by imprisonment for life" if convicted of
a second offense when the prior offense involved a minor less than eleven years old).
'60 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-9-1.7 (West 2005).
161 D.C. CODE § 22-3008 (2001).
162 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595 (1977) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2)
(1976); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3702 (1974)).
Both Florida and Mississippi retain the death penalty for offenders in qualifying child moles-
tation cases. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2) (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (1998).
Tennessee once imposed capital punishment for rape, but the state since repealed its statute.
See 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts 353; see also Coker, 433 U.S. at 595.
163 Only ten percent of violent child molesters are sentenced to life or given the death
sentence. See Yello Dyno, supra note 5.
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When sentenced to confinement, child molesters only serve an average of eleven
years in prison for their crimes."6 Though a decade's time is an arguably short incar-
ceration term for such a barbarous crime, many offenders opt for the castration alterna-
tive if available. 65 Preferring the freedoms of probation or parole is understandable
when juxtaposed to confinement in a small cell. For good reason "child molesters
[also] fear going to prison."' 66 Other prisoners abhor sex offenders, "especially
those convicted of victimizing children."' 67 Once in jail, many child molesters be-
come targets of violence by other inmates-some suffer severe beatings, others lose
their lives. 68 Rapists may become victims of sex crimes while behind bars. 69 Mere
imprisonment-particularly for such a short period-is a trifling punishment when
compared to the monstrous offense of child rape; but, when considering the substantial
threats child rapists are exposed to while in prison, whereby many perversely become
the victims of their own crimes, imprisonment begins to appear proportional to volun-
tary castration. There may not be a better alternative between these two punishments.
As traditional proportionality analysis of voluntary castration is inconclusive,
further assessment utilizing the contemporary death penalty proportionality rhetoric
is desirable. In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Brennan powerfully articulated the charac-
teristics contributing to the unique severity of the "ultimate sanction."' 7 ° He described
death as "an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in
its enormity."'' Although "no primitive torture" may be involved, the physical and
mental suffering attending capital sentences could be considered cruel and unusual.'72
Lacking an existing method that ensured "an immediate and painless death," death
164 Id.
165 See Rondeaux, supra note 11; Besharov & Vachhs, supra note 125, at 42 (discussing
Steven Butler's request for "surgical castration and 10 years of probation as his punishment
instead of imprisonment" after being convicted of raping a thirteen-year-old girl).
"6 O'Connor & Carson, supra note 148.
167 See James E. Robertson, A Clean Heart and an Empty Head: The Supreme Court and
Sexual Terrorism in Prison, 81 N.C. L. REv. 433, 462 & n.216 (2003).
168 See Jessica Gardner, Ex-Superintendent Beaten: Molester Injured in Holding Cell, TIMES
HERALD-REC. (Middletown, N.Y.), Sept. 26, 2003, available at http://archive.recordonline
.con/archive/2003/09/26/jgsigler.htm (discussing the beating of convicted pedophile Robert
Sigler and the murder of "[d]efrocked priest and convicted child molester" John Geoghan).
169 In a survey of federal and state correctional facilities, there were an estimated 6241
reported allegations of sexual violence during 2005. ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON,
DEP'T. OF JUST., USDOJ BSJ SPEC. REP. 214646, SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORTED BY
CORRECTIONAL AuTHORITIEs, 2005 (July 2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/svrca05.pdf; see also Joanne Mariner, Behind Bars in America, HUM. RTS., Spring
2002, at 9, 10 ("Certain prisoners are targeted for sexual exploitation upon entering a penal
facility, particularly those who are.., convicted of a sexual offense against a minor.").
170 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
171 Id. at 287.
172 See id. at 271.
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row inmates were certain to suffer when executed.173 Many capital convicts also
endured mental breakdowns; the "onset of insanity while awaiting execution" was
relatively common. 174 Adding to this psychological trauma was the enormity of the
state's proclamation in handing down the death sentence, as "[t]he calculated killing
of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed
person's humanity."' 75 A criminal awaiting capital punishment lost the "right to have
rights."' 176 Under Justice Brennan's conception, a death row imnate abjectly agonized
in his misery until his painful sentence was carried out.
17 7
The physical and mental plight of a capital punishment inmate are important to
the proportionality assessment, but the inescapable finality inherent in the punish-
ment is the weightiest element implicated under Eighth Amendment analysis. 178 The
distinction between life and death is not "negligible."' 179 Unlike a prison sentence,
capital punishment destroys an individual's "very existence"; once a sentence is carried
out, the "punishment is not irrevocable."' 80 As Justice Brennan articulated, "Death
is truly an awesome punishment."''
While capital punishment is rightfully recognized as being "in a class by itself,' 82
echoes of Justice Brennan's arguments in Furman are heard in assessments of cas-
tration' s relative severity. Though researchers cite the immediate physical suffering
and the following side effects associated with castration when characterizing the
punishment as torturous, 183 judges highlight the punishment's severe psychological
effects. When arguing against the use of either vasectomy or castration as punishment
for rape, Judge Smith McPherson stated:
17 Id. at 287.
17 Id. at 288-89 (quoting Solesbee v. Balkoom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)). The California Supreme Court noted, "the process of carrying out a verdict of
death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute psychological
torture." Id. (citing People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972)).
171 Id. at 290.
176 Id.
177 Cf. RICHARD B. LnIUCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW,
POLICY, AND PRAc-rcE 107-08 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing Soering v. United Kingdom, in which
the European Court of Human Rights held the applicant's pending extradition a violation of
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights because "it was reasonably foresee-
able that he would be subjected to a 'death row' phenomenon once in the U.S.," and such a
fate would expose the applicant to "torture and cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment").
178 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 289 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The unusual severity of death
is manifested most clearly in its finality and enormity.").
'7 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957).
'so Furman, 408 U.S. at 290.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 289.
183 See supra Part II.A.
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[E]ach operation is to destroy the power of procreation. It is, of
course, to follow the man during the balance of his life. The
physical suffering may not be so great, but that is not the only
test of cruel punishment; the humiliation, the degradation, the
mental suffering are always present and known by all the public,
and will follow him wheresoever he may go.184
Four years later in Mickle v. Henrichs, District Judge Farrington quoted Judge Smith
McPherson' 85 and proceeded by describing a criminal who underwent a vasectomy
as "handicapped by the consciousness that he bears on his person, and will carry to
his grave, a mutilation which, as punishment, is a brand of infamy."' 86 Judge
Farrington further argued that such a punishment "unnecessarily obstruct[s]" the
offender's life and concluded by asserting that "[iut will not do to argue that,
inasmuch as the death penalty may be inflicted for this crime, vasectomy, or any
other similar mutilation of the body, cannot be regarded as cruel, because the greater
includes the less."' 18
7
Judge Smith McPherson and Judge Farrington's objections, focused on the detri-
mental psychological and permanent physical effects of court-ordered vasectomies,
are easily extrapolated to surgical castration. When compared to surgical sterilization,
castration is a "similar mutilation of the body."' 188 Like a death row inmate awaiting
execution, the State's castration patients are burdened by the crushing "infamy" of
their operation. And like a prisoner whose capital sentence was carried out and his
life cut short, a convicted rapist must endure "an invasion of bodily integrity" and the
end of his "reproductive freedom."'' 89 He is denied one of the "basic civil rights of
man," "the right to have offspring."' 9 ° An executed criminal is denied life; a castrated
rapist is deprived of the right to create new life. Though certainly not attaining the
gravity of capital punishment, due to these analytical similarities, surgical castration
must be recognized as an extreme sanction.
In comparison to the highly objectionable physical and psychological effects of
surgical castration, offenders treated with chemical castration are not as intensely
affected. Of fundamental distinction, all of the side effects associated with medroxy-
progesterone acetate use are "reversible once the treatment ceases."' 9' Furthermore,
patients undergoing chemical treatment can still have families. 92 The injections rarely
1' Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 416 (S.D. Iowa 1914) (emphasis added), rev'd 242 U.S.
468 (1917).
185 262 F. 687, 690 (D. Nev. 1918).
186 Id. at 691.
187 Id.
188 Id.
89 Besharov & Vachhs, supra note 125, at 42.
'90 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 536 (1942).
191 Fitzgerald, supra note 117, at 7.
192 Id.
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cause impotence; subjects merely experience "erotic apathy."'193 As the excruciating
and permanent physical and psychological effects associated with surgical castration
are absent from the chemical treatment, analogies to the death sentence discourse of
unique severity have limited application to surgical castration. The similarities
between the rhetoric of death's uniqueness and discussions of surgical castration
indicate that the punishment should be approached cautiously. Surgical castration
alone is recognized as problematic under contemporary Eighth Amendment
proportionality review.
3. The Courts' Deference to Castration Legislation
Without a Supreme Court case on point, state and lower federal court cases must
be relied upon to gauge the judiciary's current deference to legislative provisions for
voluntary castration.
In a rare case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina directly assessed the constitu-
tionality of voluntary castration under the state's constitution. In State v. Brown, three
defendants pled guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct."9 The trial judge sen-
tenced each defendant to thirty years imprisonment but provided that the balance of
the sentences could be suspended if the defendants voluntarily agreed to be surgically
castrated.'95 After filing then subsequently abandoning their appeals, each defendant
requested castration in order to obtain the suspended sentence."9 On review of defen-
dant Roscoe James Brown's motion for a writ of mandamus to exercise the suspended
sentence, the Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized that although statutory
language gave trial courts "wide... discretion in imposing conditions of suspension
or probation [the tribunal] cannot impose conditions which are illegal and void as
against public policy.' 197 The court held that castration was "a form of mutilation"
prohibited by the state's constitutional ban of cruel and unusual punishment. 98 Though
the statutory provision relied upon by the trial court in offering the suspended sentence
did not explicitly permit castration as a prerequisite to probation, the state's supreme
court rejected any statutory construction authorizing voluntary castration.' 99 The
court rendered its prohibition without regard to legislative intent.2°°
193 Id. Dr. John Money asserts that "chemical castration" is a misnomer, clarifying "I
know people call it chemical castration, but it's reversible, and it's not castration at all."
Tamar Lewin, Texas CourtAgrees to Castration forRapist ofl3-Year-Old Girl, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1992, at A12.




198 Id. at 412.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 411-12.
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With the exception of Brown, federal and state courts confronted with ancillary
Eighth Amendment questions refused to entertain constitutional challenges on their
merits.2°' Therefore, another method of assessing whether the Supreme Court would
defer to a legislature's enactment of a castration statute is to analyze courts' treatment
of cases concerning issues of bodily integrity.
Statutes ordering convicted felons to undergo vasectomies have been questioned
for.nearly a century. In Davis v. Berry, the court assessed the constitutionality of an
Iowa statute that required performance of a vasectomy following a defendant's second
felony conviction.2 °2 Similarly, in Mickle v. Henrichs, the Nevada court reviewed a
state law that permitted courts to "direct an operation to be performed upon [a defendant
convicted of sexually abusing a child], for the prevention of procreation. 2 3 Then,
in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court reviewed Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal
Sterilization Act, which allowed state courts to require "habitual criminal[s]"-those
convicted of two or more "felonies involving moral turpitude"-to "be rendered
sexually sterile."'2 °4 In each case, the reviewing court held the challenged statute un-
constitutional on either Eighth Amendment or Equal Protection grounds.20 5
A common element in the constitutional objections voiced in the Davis, Mickle,
and Skinner opinions is the argument for protecting the defendant's right to bodily
integrity. While each court couched this argument in the basic liberty to procreate,
all three opinions recognized the inherent cruelty in denying a criminal the right to
physical self-preservation.' °
Though the relevant contexts-forced submission as opposed to voluntary con-
sent-are decidedly different, the bodily integrity argument is directly applicable to
surgical castration. Like a vasectomy, surgical castration is intrusive and permanent.
But surgical castration is a more severe denial of bodily integrity than vasectomy,
as a part of the anatomy is not only severed, but also permanently removed and dis-
carded.207 As chemical castration leaves no lasting physical handicap once treatment
is discontinued, the arguments against vasectomy are inapplicable.2 °8 In light of the
judiciary's consistent refusal to defer to legislative intent when statutes provide for
the destruction of bodily integrity, the Supreme Court should be equally unlikely to
defer to legislative claims of voluntary surgical castration's constitutionality.
201 See, e.g., ACLU of Ark. v. State, 5 S.W.3d 418 (Ark. 1999); People v. Steele, No.
C044408, 2004 WL 2897955, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2004).
202 216 F. 413,414 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd, 242 U.S. 468 (1917).
203 262 F. 687, 687 (D. Nev. 1918).
204 316 U.S. 535, 536-37 (1942).
205 See cases cited supra notes 203-05.
206 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; Mickle, 262 F. at 691; Davis, 216 F. at 416.
207 See supra text accompanying note 119.
208 See supra text accompanying note 191.
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4. Customary Use of Voluntary Castration
Though penal statutes providing for voluntary castration are a relatively new
legislative invention,2° mandatory castration has been practiced for centuries. In
twelfth-century England, treason was punished with both the loss of one's eyes and
castration.1 ° Voluntary castration is still used in several Western European countries
for prisoners with sexual disorders, but this practice has decreased in recent years.
211
Castration has an equally dark history in the United States. The punishment was
originally imposed on slaves and prisoners of war.212 Beginning at the close of the
nineteenth century, incompetents were targeted by the eugenics movement on the
pretense of protecting the "welfare of society.' '213 But castration was not only used as
a punishment. Before the practice was banned, castrati-young boys castrated to pre-
serve their high falsetto-proudly appeared in operas.2t 4 In current medical practice,
the procedure is a life-saving treatment for men suffering from testicular or prostate
cancer.215 Some cases of testicular injury also require castration.216 Transsexuals
suffering from gender identity disorder also seek castration as a component of sex
reassignment surgery.217
Currently, when castration is used as a punishment, it is the exception not the rule.
Only eight of the fifty states have statutes authorizing either chemical or surgical
castration of sex offenders. 18 Of those eight, seven states offer chemical castration
as the primary means of treatment; Texas is the lone state to require the surgical
209 Kevin Giordano, The Chemical Knife, SALON, Mar. 1,2000, http://archive.salon.com
health/feature/2000/03/0 1/castration/ (noting that in 1996 California was the first state to
enact a chemical castration law).
210 Davis, 216 F. at 416.
211 Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 372-76 (including Denmark, Germany, Norway,
Sweden, the Netherlands, and Switzerland). No sex offenders have been castrated in Denmark
since 1972. Id. at 374. The reliance on castration in Germany has also diminished, as four
hundred sex offenders underwent orchiectomies between 1970 and 1980, but only about fifty
offenders had the surgery between 1980 and 1989. Id. Researchers suggest that this decrease
in practice is related to the growing sentiment that castration is "ethically problematic." Bailey
& Greenberg, supra note 150, at 1229.
212 Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 386.
213 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927) (upholding a Virginia law that provided for
sterilization of persons with mental defects).
214 Terry Teachout, He Sings Higher, TIME, June 7, 1999, at 77.
215 Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 369.
216 Id.
217 See White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322,324 (8th Cir. 1998); Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d
610, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
218 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (2007); IOWA CODE
§ 903B.10 (2007); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:538 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512
(2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 144.625 (2007); TEX. GOv'TCODE ANN. § 501.061 (Vernon 2004);
Wis. STAT. § 304.06 (2007).
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procedure.2 9 Though the majority of states with castration statutes show a bias for
chemical programs, four states also have statutes that recognize the availability of
a voluntary "permanent, surgical alternative."'22 Although the use of chemical cas-
tration is far from widespread, the surgical procedure is far less prevalent.
Considerations of current practice are critical in analyzing the customary use of
a punishment, but the dynamic quality of state criminal procedure codes must also
be recognized. While legislatures in Virginia,
221 Mississippi, 222 and New York223
recently considered adding castration provisions to their books, Georgia's legislature
repealed its provision for the punishment.224 In the past, several legislatures also
reviewed bills that would have incorporated castration treatment statutes into state
penal codes, but these bills were subsequently defeated.225 All told, only eighteen
states have given serious consideration to adopting or have adopted castration pro-
visions. Fewer of these statutes are in force than were initially proposed. Within this
relatively limited practice, chemical castration is more widely accepted among the
states than surgical castration, but neither punishment is popular.
219 See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 501.061 (Vernon 2004).
220 See CAL. PENALCODE § 645(e) (West 2007); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.0235(1)(b)
(West 2006); IOWA CODE § 903B.10.1 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:538:C(8) (2008).
Furthermore, if a defendant volunteers for surgical castration he would not be subject to
chemical treatment.
221 S.B. 1203, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007). Senator Emmett W. Hanger, Jr. introduced
a bill which, if enacted, would allow a prisoner convicted of a sexually violent offense to file
a petition requesting a court order providing "that the prisoner undergo physical castration and
be placed on conditional release" as an "alternative to involuntary secure inpatient treatment."
Id. The bill was vetoed on April 10, 2007. Press Release, Governor Kaine Announces Action
on Legislation from 2007 Reconvened Session (Apr. 10, 2007), available at http://www
.governor.virginia.gov/mediarelations/newsreleases/viewRelease.cfm?id-376.
222 H.B. 103, 122nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2007) (leaving the method of castration unspec-
ified). The proposal died in committee on Jan. 30, 2007. Mississippi Legislative Information
Systems, House Bill 103, http://billstatus.is.state.ms.us/2007/pdf/history/HB/HBO103.htm (last
visited Feb. 8, 2008).
223 S.B. 02680, 230 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (providing for chemical castration). The
bill died in assembly on Jan. 9, 2008. New York State Assembly, Bill Summary-S02680,
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=S02680 (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
224 See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.2 (West 1997), repealed by GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.2
(West 2006). The deleted section related to medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment and coun-
seling for child molesters as parole requirements.
225 See H.B. 3, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2006) (surgical castration); H.B. 1131,84th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005) (chemical or surgical castration); S.B. 1585, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2005) (voluntary chemical or surgical castration); S.B. 1061, 189th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Pa. 2006) (chemical castration with surgical alternative); see also Fromson, supra note
95, at 315 (identifying castration bills proposed in Hawaii, New Mexico, and Washington, all
of which were eventually struck down).
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5. Public Opinion of Voluntary Castration
Even though sex offenders are "some of the most hated and reviled members of
society, ' 226 there is great divergence in public opinion concerning whether states
should provide voluntary castration. Interest groups at both ends of the spectrum
justify their arguments in the frequently contradictory and inconclusive research
available on castration.
The most vocal opponents of voluntary castration are victims' rights activists
and civil liberties groups. Drawing on impermissibly high recidivism rates,
227 victims'
rights activists argue that sexual predators cannot be rehabilitated and should remain
in prison.228 Understandably, for victims and their loved ones who have lived
through the devastation of sexual assault, the only means of protecting society is to
keep convicted rapists separated from the rest of the population. 9 As District
Attorney Tony Rackauckas opined, "U]ust because [sexual deviants] have been
castrated doesn't change what's going on in their minds., 230 This skepticism of
rehabilitation leads many victims' rights activists to share the sentiment that
"[i]ncarceration and civil commitment are the only 100-percent-effective methods
of preventing sex-offender recidivism."231
Though arguing in favor of the same outcome, interest groups focused on humani-
tarian issues assert that castration should not serve as an alternative to imprisonment
because the punishment is "ethically problematic. 232 Surgical castration, character-
ized as physical mutilation, is criticized as an "abhorrent '233 and barbaric procedure.2 4
The operation is considered "a nearly unthinkable invasion of a person's body.,
235
Physicians fostering these convictions have refused to perform state-authorized
operations on convicted rapists.236 In addition to drawing attention to castration as
226 Adam Shajnfeld & Richard B. Krueger, Reforming (Purportedly) Non-Punitive
Responses to Sexual Offending, 25 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 81, 99 (2006).
227 See supra text accompanying note 7.
228 Robert Crowe, Drugs, Surgery May Temper Drive, but Sexual Interest Won't
"Normalize," HOUSTON CHRON., May 10, 2005, at B 1.
229 See Julian Guthrie, Care or Jail for Molesters?, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 4, 2002, at Al.
John Walsh created the television programAmerica's Most Wanted after his six-year-old son
was murdered by a pedophile. Id. Walsh argues, "[tihe longer these monsters are in prison,
the less chance they have to hurt kids. I don't buy this notion of treatment." Id.
230 CourtTV.com, Castrated Child Molester Wants to Be Freed from Mental Hospital,
July 6, 2006, http://www.courttv.com/news/2006/0703/molester-ap.html.
231 Paul Martin Andrews, Letter to the Editor, What It Takes to Stop Sexual Predators,
WASH. POST, July 12, 2006, at A14.
232 Bailey & Greenberg, supra note 150, at 1229.
233 Besharov & Vachhs, supra note 125, at 42.
234 Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 353.
235 Francine Russo, How to Change a Personality, TIME, Jan. 18, 2007, at 101.
236 Besharov & Vachhs, supra note 125, at 42. Though urologists' reluctance to perform
the surgery "reflects the unusual nature of the procedure," many practitioners do "not want
to become involved because of fear of bad publicity or lawsuits." Bailey & Greenberg, supra
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a potentially cruel punishment,237 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has
been a leader in spotlighting the likelihood of "far-reaching abuse" associated with
voluntary castration.238 In an interview sponsored by the ACLU, lawyer and social
critic Wendy Kaminer voiced concern over the potential for corruption inherent in
voluntary sentencing practices. 239 Kaminer emphasized her difficulty in "imagin[ing]
that when confronted with prison, the choice to have yourself castrated ever could
be voluntary. It seems like cruel and unusual punishment to me when it's coerced."240
Thus, opponents of voluntary castration focus on the punishment's ineffectiveness,
brutality, and great potential for abuse.
The proponents of voluntary castration come from disparate backgrounds, includ-
ing doctors, academics, politicians, and convicted rapists. Contrary to claims made
by victims' rights activists, medical researchers assert that sex offenders can be
treated. 24' Some mental health professionals liken pedophilia to alcoholism; as both
disorders have genetic origins, many doctors believe both are equally treatable.
242
Some studies indicate that the results of surgical castration are highly successful, as
"recidivism rates of non-castrates [were found to be] up to eighty percent compared
to as little as 2.2% for castrates. 243 Others studies show that chemical treatment is
effective for paraphiliacs and may be as effective as surgical castration. 244 Proper
treatment merely requires accurate diagnosis.245
note 150, at 1245.
237 See Giordano, supra note 209; see also ACLU of Ark. v. State, 5 S.W.3d 418 (Ark.
1999) (claiming next-friend standing, the ACLU intervened on behalf of a convicted child
rapist to have the surgical castration element of the rapist's plea agreement set aside).
238 Larry Helm Spalding, Florida's 1997 Chemical Castration Law: A Return to the Dark
Ages, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 117, 136 (1998); see also Larry Helm Spalding, Chemical
Castration: A Return to the Dark Ages, TORCH, Aug. 1997, http://www.aclufl.org/about/
newsletters/1997/chem.cfm (arguing that Florida's castration statute is "a horrific new punish-
ment [based] on a faulty premise").
239 Wendy Kaminer on Crime, June 24, 1995, http://www.aclu.org/police/gen/14567res
20020304.html.
240 id.
241 See Flack, supra note 153, at 182-83 (discussing Dr. Fred Berlin's successful treatment
of pedophiles).
242 See Guthrie, supra note 229.
243 Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 370-71.
244 See Fitzgerald, supra note 117, at 5. Paraphiliacs are offenders "who exhibit[] apattern
of sexual arousal, erection and ejaculation, which is characterized by a specific fantasy or its
actualization." Id. at 4. Sex offenders are categorized according to particular behavioral traits:
Type I denies the commission of the crime or the criminal nature of
the act. Type II confesses to the commission of the crime, but places
the blame for the crime on nonsexual or nonpersonal forces, such as
alcohol, drugs, or stress. Type III is the violent criminal who is moti-
vated by nonsexual gain, such as anger, power, or violence. Type IV
is the paraphiliac ....
Id.
245 Id. at 5.
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Confronted with the reality that the "sexually motivated sex offender will not
likely be deterred by lengthy incarceration, ' ' 4 many academics are willing to sup-
port alternative treatment programs developed by medical researchers. Responding
to the promising statistics that show a substantial decrease in recidivism rates for
surgically castrated convicts247 and relying on studies suggesting that both methods
of castration are equally effective, 248 some researchers argue that testosterone-reducing
drugs should be accompanied by psychotherapy to help "free[] the offender from his
compulsive sex drive" and "reorder his life" while remaining in the community.249
Rebutting claims of cruelty inherent in the procedure, other legal scholars argue that
neither form of voluntary castration infringes Eighth Amendment protections if such
decisions are made in "a carefully regulated therapeutic context, accompanied by
heightened precautions that bar any penological considerations. 25 ° One commentator
even argues "castration may even be a more humane form of punishment than incar-
ceration., 2 5 ' But, while calling for "less restrictive alternatives" to traditional incar-
ceration and civil commitment, many scholars are careful to point out that further
research is essential to "examining, evaluating, and improving the efficacy of non-
biological and biological treatment.
252
In addition to looking for methods of lowering recidivism rates and accordingly
protecting their constituency from crime, politicians trumpet the tax-saving virtues
of voluntary castration. As the U.S. inmate population has dramatically increased
to "2.2 million on a given day," with 13.5 million adults passing through the nation's
prisons and jails each year, the government is required to spend "an estimated $60
billion on corrections" annually. 253 Furthermore, a recent report counted that "roughly
566,700 registered sex offenders" have been processed by the U.S. legal system.254
"[T]he cost of operating special facilities for the commitment of sex offenders at the
national level is estimated to be $244 million per year." 5 In response to this enormous
drain on state treasuries, lawmakers are considering ways to combat the overwhelming
financial burdens and overcrowding faced by the prison system.256 When Senator
Hanger initially introduced his castration bill to the Virginia Senate, the punishment
was included in a list of "cost-reduction methods" intended to cut government spending
246 Flack, supra note 153, at 179.
247 See supra text accompanying note 243.
248 See Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 371-72.
249 Fitzgerald, supra note 117, at 9, 16-17; Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 368-69.
250 Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 411.
251 Fromson, supra note 95, at 320-21.
252 Shajnfeld & Krueger, supra note 226, at 98-99.
253 Peter Slevin, U.S. Prison Study Faults System and the Public, WASH. POST, June 8,
2006, at A4.
254 Shajnfeld & Krueger, supra note 226, at 83.
255 Id. at 93.
256 See Slevin, supra note 253.
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in Virginia.25 7 As several states require sex offenders to pay treatment expenses,
castration programs allowing for reduced sentences can potentially save the states
hundreds of thousands of dollars in incarceration costs. 25 8 Political advocates of vol-
untary castration thus focus on the treatment's dual benefits of reduced recidivism
rates and increased available state funding.
While sentence reductions are certainly appealing when facing decades of confine-
ment, some convicted rapists submit to castration to escape their sexual disorders
and take a step toward rehabilitation.259 Sex offenders suffering from paraphilia
"experience 'recurrent intense sexual urges and sexually arousing fantasies of at least
six months duration.'" 26 Paraphiliacs are primarily motivated by their consuming
sexual desires.2 6 ' These sexual compulsions produce "dangerously insatiable" appe-
tites.262 Recognizing the severity of their conditions, some convicted rapists seek
an equally extreme remedy.263 Many child molesters make newspaper headlines and
draw the attention of legal scholars by choosing to go under the knife.264
With powerful interest groups lobbying against one another, there is no domi-
nant and clear public policy position on castration. But, when comparing the two
methods of castration, society at large is characterized as more "squeamish" about
surgical castration.265
In applying the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment analysis to the castration
punishment, a trend emerges pointing towards rejection of voluntary surgical
257 See Green, supra note 10.
258 See IOWA CODE § 903B. 10.5 (2007); LA. REv. STATE. ANN. § 15:538:C(5) (2008); see
also Flack, supra note 153, at 181 (describing the cost saving benefits of implementing a
chemical castration program; the chemical treatment costs $7000 per year, as compared to
the $24,000 a year to keep a criminal behind bars); Shajnfeld & Krueger, supra note 226, at
95 & n. 174 (noting that medroxyprogesterone acetate injections, which are effective for up
to three months, cost between $30 and $75 per treatment, while depot-leuprolide acetate
injections cost $2660 per four-month dose).
259 See Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas Frees Child Molester Who Warns of New Crimes,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1996, at B7.
260 Flack, supra note 153, at 175 (citing THE MERCK MANUAL ONLINE, http://www.merck
.com).
26 Bailey & Greenberg, supra note 150, at 1227.
262 Flack, supra note 153, at 177.
263 Larry Don McQuay, a self-proclaimed "child-molesting demon" who assaulted approxi-
mately 240 children, believed surgical castration might "stop his urge to molest." Molester
Faces Lock-and-Key Parole, CNN, Apr. 8, 1996, http://www.cnn.com/US/9604/08/molester/
index.html. Inmate James Jenkins castrated himself with a razor after Virginia officials refused
his request for the operation. Rondeaux, supra note 11, at B 1. Reflecting on his drastic actions,
Jenkins said "Castration has done precisely what I wanted it to do .... I have not had any
sexual urges or desires in over two years. My mind is finally free of the deviant sexual fantasies
I used to have about young girls." Id.
264 See supra text accompanying notes 196, 263.
265 Winslade et al., supra note 3, at 367.
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castration and acceptance of voluntary chemical castration. Though arguably propor-
tional in severity to the offense of child rape, surgical castration is a cruel mutilation
of the body that has received little support from the courts or legislatures, while gar-
nering substantial public protest. As the objections leveled against surgical castration
are largely inapplicable to the chemical treatment, voluntary surgical castration alone
should be held unconstitutional.
II1. WAIVING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
As established in Part 11, while chemical castration should not be considered an
unconstitutional treatment, surgical castration is a cruel and unusual punishment.
If the courts accept this argument should a criminal defendant be allowed to waive
his Eighth Amendment protections and submit to surgical castration?
A. Establishing the Appropriateness of Waiver
Though a presumption against waiver is firmly rooted in case law, with "'courts
indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitu-
tional rights," defendants are regularly permitted to relinquish some of the protec-
tions afforded by the Bill of Rights.26 In Johnson v. Zerbst, Justice Black, writing
for the majority, recognized that criminal defendants are entitled to waive certain
rights-to "intentional[ly] relinquish[] or abandon[] ... a known right or privilege. 267
As waiver jurisprudence developed, safeguards were established to protect defen-
dants from unjust deprivations of their constitutional rights.268 In certain contexts,
only if a defendant's decision to relinquish his constitutional rights constituted a
"voluntary, . . . knowing, intelligent act[]" would the waiver be recognized.269
Under this test, voluntariness requires that the waiver "not be extracted by any sort
of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,
nor by the exertion of any improper influence., 270 Additionally, the stipulation that
the waiver must also be knowing and intelligent prescribes that the defendant have
"sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences" of his
resolution. 27' Furthermore, the knowing and intelligent element presupposes that the
26 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301
U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
267 id.
261 See Kirchmeier, supra note 116, at 631-32 (discussing "various situations that do not
require voluntary, intelligent and knowing waiver" of constitutional rights).
269 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
270 Id. at 753 (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)).
271 Id. at 748. In the context of inmate medical treatment, a cognizant waiver follows if the
defendant is first made to understand the "nature of the treatment, [given] a written description
of the purpose, risks and effects of treatment, and advis[ed] ... of his right to terminate the
consent at any time." Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 1973).
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defendant is "mentally competent., 272 A finding of competency requires that there
be no "meaningful evidence that [the defendant] was suffering from a mental disease,
disorder, or defect that substantially affected his capacity to make an intelligent de-
cision. 273 Once a court acknowledges that a competent defendant has voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly waived a right, efficacy is typically given to the defen-
dant' s resolution.
Criminal defendants are entitled to waive a lengthy list of constitutional pro-
tections. Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination 274
and the right to trial275 can be relinquished. Additionally, the rights of representation
by counsel,276 trial by jury,277 public trial,278 prosecution in the jurisdiction where the
offense was committed, 279 presence at trial,28° and provision for a speedy trial, 28' all
of which are provided by the Sixth Amendment,282 can also be abandoned.
These waivable Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees display an important
commonality-they are all "considered fundamental to the fair administration of
American justice." '283 In Faretta v. California, Justice Stewart appropriately character-
ized the criminal defendant's right "to have the assistance of counsel for his defence, ' 28
along with the other Sixth Amendment protections, as "defense tools."28 The Sixth
272 Knecht, 488 F.2d at 1140.
273 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 166 (1990).
274 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,460 (1966) (holding that the individual has the
right to remain silent, but he can waive the right by "choos[ing] to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will").
275 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,748 (1970) (holding that a defendant's guilty
plea constitutes "consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial-a waiver
of his right to trial before ajury or ajudge" (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
276 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (holding that the accused can waive the
right to counsel).
277 See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) (holding that a criminal defendant can
waive his right to a jury trial if the prosecution and the trial court approve the waiver).
278 See id. at 35 (holding that while "a defendant can, under some circumstances, waive
his constitutional right to a public trial, he has no absolute right to compel a private trial").
279 See Platt v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240 (1964) (recognizing that a defendant
may request change of venue under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 1(b)).
280 See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912) (holding that a defendant who voluntarily
absents himself from trial waives his right to be present and to confront adverse witnesses
testifying during his absence).
28' See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000) (holding that defense counsel can waive
the defendant's right to be tried within a statutorily prescribed period).
282 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.., and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
283 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (emphasis added).
284 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
285 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820.
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Amendment provides basic procedural protections to "our adversary system of
criminal justice." '286 The Fifth Amendment's requirement of indictment by a grand
jury, elimination of double jeopardy, and barrier against self-incrimination 287 are com-
parable to the Sixth Amendment's protections. Waivers of these rights reflect the
criminal defendant's "choice of procedure" during the process of determining guilt.
288
B. Waiving the Eighth Amendment Protection Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishments
Recognizing criminal defendants' entitlement to relinquish certain procedural
rights, the Supreme Court also requires that the principles of waiver "be construed
and applied so as to preserve-not destroy--constitutional safeguards of human life
and liberty. 289 Because the Eighth Amendment serves as the final line of protection
of constitutional freedoms prior to punishment within the criminal justice system,
a defendant should not be entitled to voluntarily waive this essential aegis against
cruel and unusual punishment.
1. Contrasting the Results of Waiving Criminal Procedure Rights and Eighth
Amendment Protections
The rights protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and the Eighth Amend-
ment are fundamentally different, and unsurprisingly, the results of waiving these
liberties are equally divergent. As described above, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
protect procedural rights throughout trial.29° These provisions assist the trier of fact
in making an accurate determination of guilt. A waiver of procedural rights may
strategically benefit a defendant 29' without hindering the fact-finder's assessment of
the evidence. In contrast, while the Eighth Amendment includes a procedural com-
ponent (by prohibiting a tribunal from imposing an unconstitutional sentence),292 the
central import of the provision is to protect a defendant from enduring a brutal and
286 Id. at 818.
287 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
288 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 814-15 (quoting Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269,279 (1942)).
289 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
290 See supra text accompanying notes 283-88.
291 Fearingjury prejudice, some defendants believe there is an advantage in having ajudge
decide their case. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 25-26 (1965). Other criminal
defendants, concerned that an overburdened public defender will fail to represent them ade-
quately, choose to represent themselves. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807; see also Kirchmeier,
supra note 16, at 646 (suggesting that the defendant's waiver of procedural rights may not
only benefit the defendant, but society as well).
292 Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47
UCLAL. REV. 113, 174 (1999) (differentiating between the Eighth Amendment's "procedural"
and "substantive" requirements).
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extreme punishment after an establishment of guilt.293 Unlike the relinquishment of
procedural rights, a dismissal of Eighth Amendment safeguards undermines the essen-
tial purpose of the constitutional resolution. Sacrificing Eighth Amendment protec-
tions following waiver will only subject the offender to tortuous penalties unauthorized
in all other circumstances. 294 Even if the choice is made intelligently and knowingly,
waiver of the Eighth Amendment immediately exposes the defendant to greater perils
than could waiver of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. Errors in trial procedure are
grounds for appellate review and reversal; a punishment, once inflicted, can never
be fully amended. In light of these intrinsic differences, general waiver provisions
for criminal procedural rights should not apply to Eighth Amendment protections.
2. Court Treatment of Eighth Amendment Waivers
Recognizing this essential distinction between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights and the Eighth Amendment protections, several state and federal courts inflex-
ibly held that cruel and unusual punishments may not be imposed, even if the defen-
dant submits to the unconstitutional penalty. In Henry v. State, the Supreme Court
of South Carolina addressed a defendant's punishment for thirty counts of forgery.295
A component of the defendant's sentence required banishment from the state "in the
event of revocation of his probation."29 Chastising the trial court's momentously
flawed sentence, Chief Justice Lewis asserted that the lower court "was without
authority to impose banishment from the State as a condition of probation, even if
appellant agreed to the sentence. ' 297 The probation conditions of the sentence were
inherently "invalid." 298 Though Chief Justice Lewis did not directly refer to the Eighth
Amendment, he recognized that the defendant's implied waiver of his protections
against cruel and unusual punishment failed to give the tribunal power to impose an
unconstitutional sentence.29
In Commonwealth v. McKenna, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed
a jury sentence imposing imprisonment for ten to twenty years for rape and capital
punishment for a murder conviction." The jury submitted this punishment on the
293 See supra Part I.B.l.a; see also Kirchmeier, supra note 16, at 646 (drawing a
distinction between the Eighth Amendment's prohibitions of "procedural violation[s]" and
"barbaric punishment[s]").
294 Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation and the Capital Defendant Who Wants to Die, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 693, 712 (2006) (arguing that allowing the waiver of Eighth Amendment
protections "transmutes what would otherwise be an unconstitutional governmental action
into a constitutional one"); see also infra text accompanying note 311.




299 Id. Banishment from a state can be analogized to denaturalization. See supra note 112
and accompanying text.
30 383 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1978).
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basis of an unconstitutional statute granting the panel immense discretion.3"' Though
the defendant initially moved to have his sentence reduced, he later withdrew his
motion for review. 2 When hearing the case on appeal, Pennsylvania's Supreme
Court recognized that the motion's revocation functioned as the defendant's waiver
of his right to challenge the constitutionality of both the statute and his sentence.30 3
In spite of this waiver, the court concluded that the "sentence [could] not stand and
must be vacated, appellant's professed desire to the contrary notwithstanding.
'31
Disregarding standard appellate procedure, the court refused to impose a sentence
"in a manner clearly contrary to the express law of the land."3 5
Ninth Circuit precedent also held that Eighth Amendment protections cannot be
waived. In Dear Wing Jung v. United States, the Court of Appeals reversed a lower
court sentence that suspended imprisonment on the condition that the defendant leave
the country. 306 The appellate court asserted "it is not enough for the government to
answer that such condition merely gave the defendant a 'choice."3' The Ninth Circuit
reasserted its previous pronouncement on "choice" in Campbell v. Wood, stating "the
government may [not] cloak unconstitutional punishments in the mantle of 'choice.' 308
When the Ninth Circuit revisited the issue in LaGrand v. Stewart, the principle that
"Eighth Amendment protections may not be waived" was affirmed once again.
309
Although the Supreme Court has yet to refuse a defendant's waiver of Eighth
310Amendment protections, several Justices have strongly voiced their dissenting belief
that Eighth Amendment protections cannot be abandoned. 31" In Gilmore v. Utah,
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent, unambiguously
stated, "the consent of a convicted defendant.., does not privilege a State to impose
a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment., 31 2 In full agreement,
Justice Marshall asserted that the Eighth Amendment protects both the defendants'
right "not to be victims of cruel and unusual punishment" and society's interest "in
301 Id. at 178.
302 Id. at 176.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 177.
305 Id. at 180.
306 312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1962).
307 Id. at 75-76.
308 18 F.3d 662, 680 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1215 (1994).
109 173 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1999).
310 See Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115 (1999) (upholding a criminal defendant's waiver
of the right to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence of execution by lethal gas).
Professor Kirchmeier believes Stewart sets the precedent for arguing that "an elected punish-
ment may never be a cruel and unusual punishment." Kirchmeier, supra note 16, at 617.
311 See Kirchmeier, supra note 16, at 633-34 (discussing Justices White, Marshall, and
Brennan's analysis of Eighth Amendment waiverin the Gilmore, Lenhard, and Whitmore cases).
312 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
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ensuring that state authority is not used to administer barbaric punishments. 3t3 In
Lenhard v. Wolff, Justice Marshall reasserted his convictions expressed in Gilmore
and continued by arguing that "there can be no such waiver" of Eighth Amendment
protections because society has an "independent stake in enforcement of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment., 314 Later, arguing
against a defendant's ability to waive appellate review of his death sentence, Justice
Marshall once again argued against waiver, stating that "[b]ecause a wrongful exe-
cution is an affront to society as a whole, a person may not consent to being executed
without appellate review" in contravention of the Eighth Amendment's protections.31 5
Justice Marshall vividly stressed "a defendant's consent to being drawn and quartered
or burned at the stake would not license the State to exact such punishments. ' '316
Beyond considering the immediate, repugnant consequences of enforcing a convicted
offender's waiver of his Eighth Amendment rights, the Justices also acknowledged
their duty to act in the best interests of society when handing down sentences.
3. Permitting Waiver of Eighth Amendment Rights Is Atrocious Policy
The policy implications of imposing punishments in violation of the Eighth
Amendment can never be far from a judge's mind. As Judge Pomeroy reflected in
Commonwealth v. McKenna, courts "must consider the interests of society as a whole
in seeing to it that justice is done, regardless of what might otherwise be the normal
procedure.317 Indeed, "giving effect to a strong public interest" is itself deemed "a
jurisprudential concern."3 8 Therefore, even when "a defendant may normally make
an informed and voluntary waiver of rights personal to himself, his freedom to do
so must give way where a substantial public policy is involved. '31 9 The social policy
embodied by the Eighth Amendment-that of protecting Americans from torturous
and extreme punishments-is undeniably one such weighty matter.
As the "evolving standards of decency" must be the lodestar for constitutional
analysis under the Eighth Amendment, 32° contemporary societal standards should
guide the judiciary's policy considerations. Though surgical castration has received
less support from alternative sentencing proponents than its chemical alternative,
public opinion towards voluntary castration remains highly fractured. 32' Without an
overwhelming consensus opposing surgical castration, the courts should be directed
313 Id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
314 444 U.S. 807, 811 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3' Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 172-73 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
316 Id.
317 383 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1978).
318 Id. at 181.
319 Id.
320 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
321 See Part II.B.5.
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by the fundamental and uncompromising dictate articulated by the Amendment
itself: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted. '322 The cruelty of surgical castration can no
longer be questioned. Furthermore, waiving the right to challenge a punishment's
constitutionality does not alter the punishment's character. Several academics astutely
argue that allowing the government to inflict brutal punishments on willing convicts
would greatly injure society by ushering in "social and moral decay" through the
toleration of "barbarous penalties" and the simultaneous abandonment of "interest
in the integrity of the justice system. '323 The effects of unconstitutional punishments
are felt beyond the few directly suffering the sentence. Adopting the medical profes-
sion's mantra of "do no harm," the courts should err on the side of caution and reject
waivers of Eighth Amendment rights rather than allowing offenders to submit to
unconstitutional punishments. As Illinois Judge Donald Hudson recognized astutely
when sentencing a convicted child rapist, "'the trading of body parts for a lesser
sentence' would set a 'dangerous precedent.'
324
CONCLUSION
The Bill of Rights was penned to fill the need for "essential barriers against
arbitrary or unjust deprivation of human rights., 325 The right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment is one of these indispensable liberties.326 Though child molesters
are among the vilest of criminals, these criminals' Eighth Amendment rights must
be protected, lest we socially regress and re-adopt the barbarous tortures of the Dark
Ages.327 Public policy surrounding established case law suggests that because Eighth
Amendment protections should not be waived only chemical castration may be im-
posed as a just punishment. Surgical castration, even if submitted to voluntarily, is an
unconstitutional punishment. Ourjustice system would become equally as depraved
as the child rapists it seeks to prosecute and punish if surgical castration were accepted
as an appropriate alternative to incarceration.
322 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
323 King, supra note 293, at 173; see also id. at 172-76 (discussing the slippery slope of
Eighth Amendment waiver); Kirchmeier, supra note 16, at 642-52 (discussing the public's
overriding interest in Eighth Amendment enforcement).
324 Bailey & Greenberg, supra note 150, at 1225.
325 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
326 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
327 See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the horrific historical means of punishment used in
Europe).
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